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In the context of higher education, this study examines the extent to which affective 
evaluations of the student experience are inﬂuenced by the point at which they are 
made (i.e. before the experience begins, whilst it is happening and after it has 
ended). It adopts a between-groups quantitative analysis of the affective 
evaluations made by 360 future, current and past postgraduate students of a UK 
business school. The study validates the proposition that affective forecasts and 
memories of the student experience are considerably inﬂated in prospect and 
retrospect; a ﬁnding that implies a signiﬁcant impact bias. It is concluded that 
the impact bias may have important implications for inﬂuencing the effectiveness 
of student decision-making, the timing and comparability of student course 
evaluations, and understanding the nature and effects of word-of-mouth 
communication regarding the student experience. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the student experience has become a topic of growing interest and 
importance in higher education (HE). Accordingly, student evaluations of courses 
and institutions are now commonplace, with results feeding into various metrics, per- 
formance indicators and rankings of institutional excellence. The increased focus on 
the student experience in HE has been accompanied by signiﬁcant academic research 
on the matter. This work is largely characterised by a focus on what students think 
about aspects of their education experience and the services their university provides 
(Brookes 2003; Bryant 2006). By contrast, others argue that what is required are 
studies that are considerate of the affective nature of the student experience (Beard, 
Clegg, and Smith 2007), and the relationship between this and student expectations 
(Miller, Bender, and Schuh 2005). 
These latter perspectives lead towards the literature on affective forecasting. Here, 
evidence has begun to accumulate for a phenomenon called the impact bias. This refers 
to a tendency for people to overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional 
reactions to future and past events. It has been demonstrated in a wide range of contexts 
(e.g. politics, health and sport; see Wilson and Gilbert 2003), and may have important 
implications for understanding and shaping the experience of students in HE. 
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The contribution of the current study lies in its examination of the existence, nature 
and extent of the impact bias in an HE context. We extend the current literature by com- 
paring students’ forecasts, perceptions and memories of their affective experience 
whilst undertaking an HE course. This differs from existing work on student evalu- 
ations of HE in two ways: First, it is concerned with how students feel during (and 
about) their HE experience (i.e. affective evaluation), rather than what they think 
about certain aspects of it (i.e. cognitive judgements, such as satisfaction). Second, 
our study moves beyond previous research by demonstrating the difﬁculties students 
may have in forecasting and remembering their feelings, and considering the impli- 
cations of this for the effectiveness of student decision-making, the timing and compar- 
ability of course evaluations, and the nature and impact of word-of-mouth 
communication about the HE experience. 
Our paper begins with a review of the extant literature regarding: (i) subjective well- 
being (SWB), cognition and affect in evaluations of the HE student experience; (ii) the 
impact bias in affective evaluations; and (iii) the nature and measurement of the impact 
bias in an HE context. Six hypotheses are formulated and tested via a study of 360 post- 
graduates at a major UK business school. These respondents comprise three groups of 
students: prospective (i.e. those about to start a small number of content-related MSc 
courses), current (i.e. those undertaking the courses, and speciﬁcally at the time the 
teaching ends and a dissertation is in progress) and past (i.e. alumni from the last 
ﬁve years of the courses concerned). This approach allows for a comparison of fore- 
casted (n = 115), perceived (n = 70) and remembered (n = 175) affective experience. 
Following a presentation of results, we conclude with a discussion of the HE manage- 
ment implications that might be associated with the impact bias in student evaluations 
of their affective experience. 
 
 
SWB, cognition and affect in evaluations  of the HE student  experience 
Concepts such as happiness, satisfaction and well-being are sometimes assumed to be 
one and the same (Easterlin 2003). However, for our paper it is necessary to deﬁne and 
examine the relationship between these concepts more closely. A salient study, in this 
respect, is that of Diener, Scollon, and Lucas (2003), who ‘review the components that 
make up the domain of subjective well-being’ (191), and present them in a conceptual 
hierarchy with various levels of speciﬁcity (see Figure 1). In so doing, they identify 
SWB as a superordinate construct determined by four conceptually related but empiri- 
cally separable components: ‘positive  affect, negative affect, [life] satisfaction, and 
domain satisfaction’ (Diener, Scollon, and Lucas 2003, 191). The ﬁrst two components 
(positive and negative affect) relate to emotional responses to life events, the aggre- 
gated outcome of which is termed ‘affective well-being’ (Diener, Scollon, and Lucas 
2003, 195). The third and fourth components (life and domain satisfaction) refer to 
the largely cognitive judgements people make about their life and aspects of it. Each 
component contains further sub-categories of discrete emotions (e.g. happiness and 
worry) with respect to affect (positive or negative), and speciﬁc criteria (e.g. fulﬁlment 
and meaning) with regard to satisfaction (life or domain-speciﬁc). 
With respect to Figure 1, academic studies of the HE experience have tended to 
focus on measuring domain satisfaction, and in particular the level and determinants 
of students’ satisfaction with their teaching, learning and wider university experience 
(see Duarte, Raposo, and Alves 2012). Some have also examined the ‘life satisfaction’ 
of students (Chow 2005; Bedggood and Donovan 2012), and others the relationship 
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Figure 1.    Conceptualising the relationships between happiness, affect, satisfaction and well- 
being (Adapted from Diener, Scollon, and Lucas 2003, 192). 
 
 
between expectations and perceptions of university experiences or services (Booth 
1997; Oldﬁeld  and Baron 2000; Sander et al. 2000; Voss, Gruber, and Szmigin 
2007; Nicholson et al. 2013; Wilson et al. 2013). 
However, few studies have speciﬁcally sought to investigate the affective experi- 
ence of HE students, despite the efforts of Beard, Clegg, and Smith (2007) to stimulate 
this. One notable exception is the work of Trigwell, Ellis, and Han (2012), in which 
student learning approaches (surface vs. deep) are correlated with the valence of 
their emotional experience (i.e. negative vs. positive). Speciﬁcally, their work identiﬁes 
that students experiencing positive emotions, such as hope and pride, are more likely to 
adopt a deeper approach to learning and achieve higher performance outcomes. By con- 
trast, those who more strongly experience negative emotions, such as anger, boredom, 
anxiety and shame, are more likely to adopt surface learning approaches and achieve 
relatively lower performance outcomes. Most recently, Chong and Ahmed (2015) 
have also examined the moderating inﬂuence of students’ feelings about their perform- 
ance outcomes on their subsequent perceptions of the university service quality experi- 
ence. In this study, however, affective responses to a discrete element of the student 
experience were considered only to the extent that they were then used as information 
in the subsequent construction of cognitive judgements. This illustrates the importance 
of affective well-being, not only as a component of SWB in its own right, but also as 
one determinant of the other component of SWB: life/domain satisfaction. As Diener, 
Scollon, and Lucas (2003, 197) note, ‘people  use their affective well-being as [one 
piece of] information when judging their life satisfaction’. 
Acknowledging the importance of affective well-being and responding to calls for a 
greater focus on this topic within the HE literature (Beard, Clegg, and Smith 2007), our 
paper is concerned with how students conceive of their affective experience, both gen- 
erally (i.e. how they ‘feel’) and with respect to their programme of study (i.e. how they 
‘feel about’ their educational experiences at university). However, in order to develop a 
holistic appreciation of affective experience, and how it may inform cognitive judge- 
ments and future behaviour, it is necessary to study how emotion is experienced in 
the three faculties of mind: imagination, perception and memory (Gilbert 2007). As 
Diener,  Scollon,  and  Lucas  (2003)  note,  affective well-being is  not  simply  the 
product of emotion as it is experienced in the moment, but rather the memories that 
people have of their emotional experience. In support of this, they draw attention to 
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research which suggests behaviour is better predicted by memory for emotions, rather 
than current emotional experience (Wirtz et al. 2003). In an HE context, affective 
memory may thus shape the subjective well-being, attitudes, decisions and behaviours 
of existing students and alumni. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine how people 
imagine they will feel in the future, as many important decisions are made on this 
basis (Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003), including those made by prospective and 
current HE students. However, both ‘affective  forecasts’  and ‘affective  memories’ 
may be subject to a signiﬁcant impact bias. 
 
 
Impact  bias in affective evaluations 
Impact bias refers to a human tendency to overestimate emotional responses to events 
and experiences. It is demonstrated primarily in the social psychology literature on 
affective forecasting and is manifest in two forms; an intensity bias and a durability 
bias (see Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson 2005). Populations as diverse as sports fans 
and medical patients have been found to overestimate how they will feel, and for 
how long, on learning the outcome of football games and medical tests, respectively; 
and to do so for both positive and negative affective experiences (for a review, see 
Wilson and Gilbert 2003). Furthermore, the impact bias has been found to occur in 
both prospect and retrospect. Thus, people tend to overestimate how intense and per- 
sistent their emotional experience will be in the future, but also how intense and persist- 
ent it was in the past (Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003). 
A seminal demonstration of the positive and negative impact bias, in both prospect 
and retrospect, was provided by Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert (2003). At the point at 
which a recount was called in the US presidential election of 2000, supporters of the 
two candidates (George Bush and Al Gore) were asked to predict how they would 
feel in the event of victory or defeat for their preferred candidate. When the result 
was declared in favour of Bush (four weeks later) his supporters were found to have 
overestimated how happy they would feel at that point. Similarly, supporters of Gore 
had overestimated the negative feelings they would experience at the moment of 
defeat. Having validated the impact bias in prospect, however, the authors went on 
to demonstrate that the same voters had almost returned to their pre-election levels 
of overestimation when asked to remember how they thought they had felt on the 
day the result was declared (four weeks earlier). The same pattern of results was 
then observed in a laboratory study in which participants were required to predict 
and remember how good/bad they would feel after performing well or poorly in a 
test of social aptitude (Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003). 
Theoretical explanations for the impact bias converge on the idea that it is the 
product of a focusing illusion and/or a failure to anticipate how quickly and fully we 
will adapt to unfolding events (Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson 2005). Within this 
context, the most prominent and inﬂuential explanation relates to focalism; the ten- 
dency to think too much about the event or experience in question, and too little 
about contextual factors that are likely to occupy attention and thus temper the intensity 
and duration of emotional response to the focal event (see Wilson et al. 2000; Wilson 
and Gilbert 2005). For example, the emotional high experienced by football fans in the 
immediate aftermath of a much anticipated victory might be tempered by all manner of 
everyday factors related to family, work, health, weather, etc. Failure to anticipate the 
moderating inﬂuence of context on emotional experience is thus considered to be one of 
the main reasons for the impact bias (Wilson et al. 2000). 
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However, focalism does not imply that people are incapable of considering non- 
focal events and the moderating inﬂuence of context on their future/past feelings. 
Rather, it is the case that they often do not take these things into account. Speciﬁcally, 
Wilson et al. (2000) propose that the impact bias occurs because people place greater 
emphasis on information that is easily accessible (e.g. that relating to the focal event) 
than that which is not (e.g. that relating to all manner of contextual factors that may or 
may not arise). Indeed, when people are directed to consider the broader context in 
which a future event will impact on their emotions, their tendency towards overestima- 
tion is considerably reduced (Wilson et al. 2000). 
In addition to focalism, the impact bias for negative experiences may also occur on 
the basis of a second, simultaneous, non-conscious mechanism called immune neglect. 
This relates to the notion that people are unaware that negative experiences will activate 
an assortment of defence mechanisms and coping strategies that will enable them to 
rationalise and reconstrue the events in question (see Gilbert et al. 1998). 
The impact bias is also likely to be moderated by time. Speciﬁcally, it might be 
expected to be larger for events and experiences in the distant future/past. This may 
be the result of a waning psychological immune system (in the case of negative experi- 
ences) and/or a heightened degree of focalism (for both positive and negative experi- 
ences; see Wilson et al. 2000). Furthermore, people do not appear to learn from their 
affective experience and continue to exhibit inaccurate forecasts of future emotions 
(both positive and negative), despite the fact that these have been shown to be overes- 
timations in the past (Meyvis, Ratner, and Levav 2010). 
The only notable challenge to the impact bias thesis is from Levine et al. (2012). 
They raise the possibility that the impact bias may be a product of a ‘procedural arte- 
fact’, whereby forecasters are often asked to think speciﬁcally about the impact of an 
event on their feelings (e.g. ‘how will you feel following the outcome of an event?’), 
while experiencers are asked to consider their feelings more generally (e.g. ‘how do 
you feel at this point in time?’).  However, Wilson and Gilbert (2013) provide a 
robust rebuttal of this argument on both theoretical and methodological grounds. 
Speciﬁcally, they cite a series of studies in which the attention of all participants has 
been drawn to the event in question at each stage of evaluation, and/or great care has 
been taken to ensure the apparent impact bias is not due to respondents’ confusion 
as to the meaning of the questions they were asked (Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 
2003; Wilson et al. 2004). 
 
 
Examining  impact bias in an HE context 
Academic research suggests that students generally conceive of their university experi- 
ence to be positive (Brookes 2003; Chow 2005). Moreover, results of the UK’s most 
recent Postgraduate Taught Experience Survey (PTES) mirror those of the UK National 
Student Survey (of undergraduates) in suggesting that more than 80% of students 
regard their overall experience positively, with just 9% reporting a negative view (Soi- 
lemetzidis, Bennett, and Leman 2014). Given the dominance of positive valence in 
studies and surveys of the student experience, it should be possible to demonstrate 
how the impact bias inﬂuences student evaluations from a ‘mean perspective’ (i.e. to 
predict that the mean intensity of positive affect in the moment will be signiﬁcantly 
lower than the mean intensity of forecasted and remembered affect). This is because 
the impact bias does not refer to a change of valence in affective forecasts and mem- 
ories, but rather a change in the intensity of these (see Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 
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2003). Good experiences are imagined to be better and bad experiences are imagined to 
be worse, in prospect and retrospect. Thus, the valence of affective experience in the 
moment should dictate the nature of any corresponding impact bias. In short, if the 
mean affective evaluation of the experience in the moment is positive, then mean fore- 
casted and mean remembered affective evaluations may be expected to be even more 
positive. Similarly, if the mean affective evaluation of the experience is negative, 
then mean forecasted and mean remembered affective evaluations may be expected 
to be even more negative. 
The adoption of the mean perspective is particularly useful in an HE context, as it 
allows for the impact bias to be considered and discussed within the existing paradigm 
of student evaluation research, much of which appears to be based on the mean analysis 
of evaluation scores (e.g. the UK PTES). However, it is important to acknowledge that, 
for experiences that are deemed positive by some but negative by others, the aggregate 
impact bias is the product of overestimation in two opposing directions (e.g. happiness 
and unhappiness). Thus, there is a theoretical possibility that the impact bias may be 
entirely masked in situations where it occurs for positive and negative evaluations in 
equal measure. In the HE context, therefore, we recommend that the impact bias 
should be analysed ﬁrst from the mean perspective, and then for positive and negative 
evaluations separately, wherever the number of cases in which positive and negative 
evaluations are made is sufﬁcient to warrant a  separate, statistical analysis. It is 
against this background that we formulate the research objectives and hypotheses for 
the current study, as will be outlined below. 
 
 
Research  objectives and hypotheses 
The impact bias has been examined for (i) emotional reactions to a speciﬁc event (e.g. 
the outcome of an election; see Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003) and (ii) the emotions 
felt during an extended experience (e.g. living in a sunnier climate; see Ubel, Loewen- 
stein, and Jepson 2005). The emotion studied in these instances is ‘happiness’ – this has 
traditionally been used as a proxy for the wider construct of affective well-being in the 
social psychology literature (Diener, Scollon, and Lucas 2003). In an HE context, 
research has tended to examine how positively or negatively students feel (or in 
many cases, think) about their extended experience and speciﬁc aspects of it, rather 
than exploring generic affective states. (Oldﬁeld and Baron 2000; Brookes 2003). 
As our study examines the impact bias in an HE context, it is important to consider 
both happiness in general and attitudes towards the educational experience in particular. 
The former facilitates clear replication of the impact bias in HE, in a manner previously 
revealed in other contexts (i.e. by way of happiness as a global affective judgement). 
The latter may reveal impact bias using an approach more meaningful to HE research- 
ers, institutions and those tasked with understanding and shaping the student experi- 
ence. The explicit requirement for future, past and current students to make affective 
judgements about particular aspects of their course also minimises ambiguity as to 
the nature of the evaluative task in each group (see Levine et al. 2012; Wilson and 
Gilbert 2013). 
The master’s courses providing the HE context for our study constitute a multi-epi- 
sodic student experience of approximately one year. These episodes include semester- 
based taught courses, exams, reading weeks and a dissertation period. Any one such 
episode might exert a relatively strong inﬂuence on students’ attitudes towards their 
overall experience, if it is ongoing (and thus most easily accessible in mind) at the 
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point of evaluation (see Schwarz 1998). Against this background, we ﬁrst set out to 
replicate the impact bias in terms of a global affective evaluation (i.e. happiness) 
during an extended HE experience (i.e. a master’s degree). For this purpose we formu- 
late the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1. Affective forecasts will be of the same valence as reports of affective experience in 
the moment (i.e. happy or unhappy), but will be signiﬁcantly greater in intensity. 
 
H2. Affective memories will be of the same valence as reports of affective experience in 
the moment (i.e. happy or unhappy), but will be signiﬁcantly greater in intensity. 
 
We then examine the impact bias with respect to students’ affective evaluations of the 
postgraduate experience, by way of the following hypotheses: 
 
H3. For affective evaluations of the postgraduate experience, forecasts will be of the same 
valence as reports made in the moment, but will be signiﬁcantly greater in intensity. 
 
H4. For affective evaluations of the postgraduate experience, memories will be of the 
same valence as reports made in the moment, but will be signiﬁcantly greater in intensity. 
 
Finally, we examine the impact bias for a discrete episode within the overall postgradu- 
ate experience. The episode chosen is the dissertation period, which remains a primary 
focus for students when all other aspects of their master’s course are complete. The bulk 
of dissertation work begins (in this instance) in July, when most students collect and 
analyse data under tutorial supervision. This is deﬁned as the ‘doing stage’ of the dis- 
sertation in the UK PTES 2014, and is identiﬁed as the point at which 75–86% of post- 
graduate students feel positive about their dissertation experience across a variety of 
indicators (Soilemetzidis, Bennett, and Leman 2014, 37). Thus, the ﬁnal two hypoth- 
eses are formulated as follows: 
 
H5. For affective evaluations of the dissertation experience, forecasts will be of the same 
valence as reports made in the moment, but will be signiﬁcantly greater in intensity. 
 
H6. For affective evaluations of the dissertation experience, memories will be of the same 
valence as reports made in the moment, but will be signiﬁcantly greater in intensity. 
 
The method by which these hypotheses were tested is described below, prior to the 
presentation and discussion of results. 
 
 
 
Method 
Our study, undertaken in 2012, adopts a between-groups design, which is common in 
impact bias research (Gilbert et al. 1998, 2004). The sample totals 360 participants 
(male: 34.7%; female: 65.3%) across three groups, incorporating future, current and 
past MSc students of a small number of business courses at a UK university. One 
hundred and ﬁfteen prospective students (‘forecasters’) were surveyed a week before 
the start of their course, and 10 months before the ‘doing stage’ (Soilemetzidis, 
Bennett, and Leman 2014, 37) of their dissertation. Seventy current students (‘experi- 
encers’)  were also surveyed during their course, and speciﬁcally at the dissertation 
‘doing  stage’ in July. Finally, 175 past students (‘rememberers’)  were surveyed on 
the basis that they had been alumni for between two and ﬁve years. 
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Participants completed a questionnaire in exchange for a small gift (a non-branded 
item to the value of approximately £3). We believe it unlikely that this small token of 
appreciation would have inﬂuenced results signiﬁcantly. In all three sample groups, 
participants ﬁrst completed global affective evaluation measures (adapted from 
Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003), rating how happy they were in the moment com- 
pared to on average (1 = far below average happiness, 5 = average happiness, 9 = far 
above average happiness). Using the same scale, participants then rated how they 
thought they would feel (forecasters), how they have been feeling (experiencers) or 
how they thought they had felt (rememberers) at a given point in time. As explained 
above, the focal point of evaluation was July, facilitating an examination of affective 
evaluations of the postgraduate experience and the dissertation experience speciﬁcally. 
Participants then completed an 11-point multi-item semantic differential scale, 
measuring their affective evaluations of: (a) the postgraduate experience and (b) the dis- 
sertation experience (bad/good, unpleasant/pleasant, unsatisfying/satisfying, unreward- 
ing/rewarding, worthless/valuable, unstimulating/stimulating, unengaging/engaging, 
discouraging/encouraging). These items were generated from a pilot focus group dis- 
cussion of how postgraduate and dissertation experiences are affectively evaluated. Stu- 
dents participating in the focus group were in the ‘experiencers’ cohort, but did not take 
part in the main survey. To minimise potential common method variance (Podsakoff 
et al. 2003), the postgraduate experience was rated from −5 to +5, and the dissertation 
experience from −3 to +3, on each item, with negative numbers indicating negative 
feelings, 0 being neutral and positive numbers indicating positive feelings. Finally, par- 
ticipants answered a series of proﬁling questions (e.g. age, sex and region of origin). 
In our between-groups design, a problem could be seen to arise if there are signiﬁ- 
cant changes in factors such as teaching personnel, course content, fees, etc. between 
forecasters, experiencers and rememberers. As forecasters had little knowledge of 
teaching personnel and were subject to the same course content and fee structure as 
experiencers (adjusted for inﬂation), this is less of a concern for revealing prospective 
impact bias. However, whilst fees also remained constant in real terms between experi- 
encers and rememberers, the degree to which course content changes may have materi- 
ally altered the experience of these two groups is difﬁcult to identify. 
Such a problem could potentially have been addressed by adopting a within-subject 
research design. However, this approach required the tracking of individual students, 
posing a threat to participants’ anonymity, the subsequent honesty and openness of 
their responses, and the validity of the study. Furthermore, attrition rates across the 
three measurement points were likely to be problematic, especially where rememberers 
are concerned, as the average response rate to alumni surveys at the study institution is 
below 25%. Thus, a between-groups design was selected on the basis that it would 
facilitate: (a) an assurance of respondent anonymity, (b) honesty and openness in 
responses and (c) a sufﬁcient sample of rememberers. 
 
 
Results 
Results are presented for the three dependent variables of: global affective evaluations 
(to test H1 and H2), affective evaluations of the postgraduate experience (to test H3 and 
H4) and attitudes towards the dissertation experience (to test H5 and H6). For each 
dependent variable, and in line with the rationale outlined earlier, results are presented 
ﬁrst in relation to all data (to assess impact bias from the mean perspective) and second 
with respect to positive evaluations only (to assess the positive impact bias). The 
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frequency of negative evaluations in our study is insufﬁcient to permit a valid statistical 
analysis of the negative impact bias in isolation. This is unsurprising given the rela- 
tively low incidence of negatively valenced student evaluations in previous studies 
of the student experience (see discussion above). Prior to hypothesis testing, we 
present an analysis of group proﬁle variables and their relationship with the dependent 
variables. 
 
 
Group proﬁles 
There are signiﬁcant differences between groups in terms of age (χ2 (6, 360) = 43.595, 
p < .001), with rememberers being older on average than the other groups (as may be 
expected). There are also signiﬁcant differences between groups in terms of gender 
balance (χ2  (2, 360) = 33.808, p < .001), with both the forecaster and experiencer 
groups exhibiting a female majority, while rememberers are more balanced between 
males and females. There is a signiﬁcant association between group and region of 
origin (χ2 (16, 359) = 80.649, p < .001), such that Asians make up a higher proportion 
of students in the forecaster and experiencer groups. However, while there are demo- 
graphic differences between the groups, none of these are signiﬁcantly correlated 
with the dependent variables. Thus, any signiﬁcant between-groups differences in 
the results below should not be considered to be a product of group demographics. 
 
 
Global affective evaluations 
To control for individual differences in momentary happiness, the current happiness 
measure was subtracted from the forecasted, experienced or remembered happiness 
measure (with negative numbers indicating below average happiness and positive 
numbers indicating above average happiness). This produced a single-item adjusted 
global affective evaluation indicator (a technique adopted from Wilson, Meyers, and 
Gilbert 2003). A one-way ANOVA was then conducted to compare the difference 
between forecasters, experiencers and rememberers on their adjusted global affective 
evaluations. 
 
 
Analysis of the impact bias from the mean perspective (all data) 
There is a signiﬁcant effect of evaluation mode (forecasted/experienced/remembered) 
on happiness, F (2, 339.43) = 6.09, p < .01. There is a signiﬁcant quadratic trend, F 
(1, 357) = 10.14, p < .01, indicating that current evaluations of happiness are lower 
than forecasted and remembered happiness. Planned comparisons reveal that forecasted 
or remembered happiness is signiﬁcantly greater than current affective evaluations, t 
(135.88) = 3.92, p < .01, and that there is no signiﬁcant difference between forecasters 
and rememberers. The results support hypotheses 1 and 2, showing forecasted and 
remembered affect to be signiﬁcantly more positive than that experienced in the moment 
by current students (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Analysis of the positive impact bias (negative evaluations removed) 
With the negative responses removed, there is a signiﬁcant difference between groups 
(F (2, 196.218) = 12.236, p < .001) on global affective evaluations. Planned contrasts 
and post hoc tests show a signiﬁcant difference between forecasters and experiencers 
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Figure 2.    Global affective forecasts, experiences and memories. 
 
 
 
(p < .05) and between experiencers and rememberers (p < .001), with experiencers 
exhibiting less intense overall happiness than the other groups. There is no signiﬁcant 
difference between forecasters and rememberers. The results support hypotheses 1 and 
2, showing forecasted and remembered affect to be signiﬁcantly more positive than that 
experienced in the moment by current students (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
Affective evaluations of the postgraduate experience 
The eight-item semantic differential scale measuring affective evaluations of the post- 
graduate experience had high inter-item reliability (α = .97). The scale was therefore 
transformed to a single measure. Nineteen outliers were removed. A one-way 
ANOVA was conducted to examine differences between the mean affective evaluations 
of forecasters, experiencers and rememberers. 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of the impact bias from the mean perspective (all data) 
There is a signiﬁcant effect of evaluation mode on affective evaluations of the post- 
graduate experience, F (2, 252.81) = 20.95, p < .01. There is a signiﬁcant quadratic 
trend, F (1, 338) = 22.60, p < .01, indicating that current students feel less positive 
about the postgraduate experience than forecasters or rememberers. Planned contrasts 
reveal that current students feel less positive about the postgraduate experience than 
forecasters or rememberers, t (94.23) = 4.85, p < .01, and that forecasters feel more 
positive  about  the  forthcoming  postgraduate  experience  than   rememberers,  t 
(269.40) = 4.68, p < .01. The results support both hypotheses 3 and 4, such that affec- 
tive evaluations of the postgraduate experience are signiﬁcantly more positive in pro- 
spect and retrospect than they are in-the-moment (see Figure 4). 
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Figure  3.    Global  affective  forecasts,  experiences  and  memories  (negative  evaluations 
removed). 
 
 
Analysis of the positive impact bias (negative evaluations removed) 
With the negative responses removed, there is a signiﬁcant difference between groups 
(F (2, 331) = 19.641, p < .001) in their affective evaluations of the postgraduate experi- 
ence. Planned contrasts and post hoc tests show a signiﬁcant difference between all 
groups (p < .01), with positivity highest in forecasters, then rememberers, followed 
by experiencers. The results support both hypotheses 3 and 4, such that affective evalu- 
ations of the postgraduate experience are signiﬁcantly more positive in prospect and 
retrospect than they are in-the-moment (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Affective evaluations of the dissertation experience 
The same eight-item semantic differential scale as above was used to measure affective 
evaluations of the dissertation experience. The scale had high inter-item reliability (α 
= .96), and was thus transformed to a single measure. Again, a one-way ANOVA was 
conducted to examine differences in the mean affective evaluations of forecasters, 
experiencers and rememberers. 
 
 
Analysis of the impact bias from the mean perspective (all data) 
There is a signiﬁcant effect of evaluation mode on affective evaluations of the disser- 
tation experience, F (2, 200.19) = 34.69, p < .01. There is a signiﬁcant quadratic trend, 
F (1, 356) = 52.48, p < .01, indicating that current students feel less positive about the 
dissertation experience than forecasters or rememberers. Planned contrasts reveal that 
current students feel less positive about the dissertation experience than forecasters 
or  rememberers, t  (89.20) = 6.50,  p < .01,  and  that forecasters feel more positive 
about the forthcoming dissertation experience than rememberers, t (285.98) = 5.65, 
p < .01. The results support both hypotheses 5 and 6, such that affective evaluations 
of the dissertation experience are signiﬁcantly more positive in prospect and retrospect 
than they are in-the-moment (see Figure 6). 
956 A. Grimes et al.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.    Forecasts, experiences and memories of affective attitudes towards the overall post- 
graduate experience. 
 
 
Analysis of the positive impact bias (negative evaluations removed) 
With negative responses removed, there is a signiﬁcant difference between groups 
(F (2, 209.288) = 14.833, p < .001) with respect to affective evaluations of the disser- 
tation experience. Planned contrasts and post hoc tests show a signiﬁcant difference 
between all groups (p < .01), with positivity highest in forecasters, then rememberers, 
followed by experiencers. The results support both hypotheses 5 and 6, such that affec- 
tive evaluations of the dissertation experience are signiﬁcantly more positive in pro- 
spect and retrospect than they are in-the-moment (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Discussion and implications 
Our study validates the prospective and retrospective impact bias in the context of HE. 
Speciﬁcally, in providing support for H1 and H2, the results demonstrate the impact 
bias in student evaluations of their affective well-being, and provide evidence that stu- 
dents are likely to overestimate the intensity of their emotions (in this case, happiness) 
during an extended experience (in this case, the duration of a master’s degree). Further, 
we extend the impact bias literature by demonstrating that overestimation can occur not 
only in relation to global affective states (e.g. happiness), but also with regard to 
speciﬁc affective evaluations of the experiences in question. In providing support for 
H3, H4, H5 and H6, the results indicate that students are likely to overestimate how 
positive they will feel (affective forecasts) and previously felt (affective memories) 
about their postgraduate experience and a discrete element of this (i.e. the dissertation 
experience). 
Given this demonstration of the impact bias in an HE context, the question arises as 
to what the implications are for HE management. Speciﬁcally, the difﬁculties that stu- 
dents may have in forecasting and remembering their feelings give rise to management 
implications in three areas: (i) the effectiveness of student decision-making, (ii) the 
timing and comparability of course evaluations and (iii) the nature and impact of 
word-of-mouth communications about the HE experience. 
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Figure 5.    Forecasts, experiences and memories of affective attitudes towards the overall post- 
graduate experience (negative evaluations removed). 
 
 
Inﬂuencing  the effectiveness of student decision-making 
The most documented implication of the impact bias in prospect is that it reduces people’s 
ability to make decisions that will maximise their future happiness (see Wilson and 
Gilbert 2005). In an HE context this may extend to all of the choices that students 
make before and during their student experience (e.g. choosing a university, a course, a 
place to live, elective modules, etc.). The central issue here is the tendency to overestimate 
in prospect; a notion that suggests experiences are, as a matter of course, unlikely to be as 
good or as bad as forecasted. For this reason, experimental efforts to address the impact 
bias have universally focused on altering the estimation of future emotional responses 
(rather than altering the intensity of affective states in-the-moment). This has been 
achieved by reducing the degree to which participants engage in focalism – or ‘de-focus- 
ing’ participants – at the point at which they are asked to make affective forecasts (as docu- 
mented by Sanna and Schwarz 2004; Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson 2005). 
Such de-focusing activities might be applied in schools, colleges and universities to 
improve the emotional utility of key decisions that prospective and current students are 
regularly required to make. This may be as simple as encouraging students to visualise, 
in a structured way, the variety of factors (programme-related and otherwise) that might 
impact their emotional state at a future point in time (e.g. class size, friendships, co-cur- 
ricular activities, travelling, living arrangements, etc.). 
In this manner, the deployment of de-focusing activities could enhance the support 
and guidance provided to students ahead of their decision to engage in a particular pro- 
gramme, course or activity. Similarly, de-focusing activities could also be implemented 
to assist students who are unhappy or dissatisﬁed with their current situation to more 
accurately evaluate the relative attractiveness of alternative options (e.g. leaving univer- 
sity, changing courses, etc.). Finally, with regard to aspects of the student experience 
that are expected to be negative, de-focusing might also be justiﬁed on the grounds 
that diminishing the impact bias may reduce unnecessary worry and anxiety about 
future situations (see Wilson and Gilbert 2005). 
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Figure 6.    Forecasts, experiences and memories of affective attitudes towards the dissertation 
experience. 
 
 
Timing and comparability of course evaluations 
In addition to the implications of the impact bias for student decision-making, HE man- 
agers should be aware of it when administering, analysing and interpreting student 
evaluation surveys, particularly with respect to evaluation timing and comparability. 
In terms of the former, the impact bias suggests that course evaluations undertaken 
before a course is ﬁnished are likely to differ from those gathered afterwards. If, for 
example, online course evaluation questionnaires are open for an extended period – 
overlapping teaching, post-teaching and, possibly, post-assessment – then the results 
are likely to be from students at different points on the impact bias curve. Even if stu- 
dents are being evaluated purely on the basis of their (domain) satisfaction with course 
events (rather than their affective response to these events), the impact bias can still 
indirectly inﬂuence such cognitive judgements (of satisfaction) because how people 
feel, or remember feeling, feeds into how and what they think (see Diener, Scollon, 
and Lucas 2003; Chong and Ahmed 2015). A cynical perspective might therefore 
involve capitalising on the impact bias to manipulate the timing of course evaluations 
to give more positive results, although ultimately this would not lead to long-term insti- 
tutional gain or improvements in students’ experiences and affective well-being. 
However, this is not to say the timing of evaluation surveys does not matter; indeed 
the impact bias renders timing especially important around issues of evaluation compar- 
ability. Speciﬁcally, HE managers and academics should be careful when making com- 
parisons between course evaluation results, without ﬁrst considering the time elapsed 
between the event/experience in question and the point at which it is evaluated, and 
how this may differ between courses or students. 
 
 
Nature and impact of word-of-mouth communication 
Finally, the ﬁndings of this study may have HE marketing implications, particularly for 
understanding the changing nature of word-of-mouth communication over time. In a 
social media environment students have many opportunities to review and recommend 
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Figure 7.    Forecasts, experiences and memories of affective attitudes towards the dissertation 
experience (negative evaluations removed). 
 
 
courses and institutions, both after and during their student experience. The impact bias 
could radically alter the nature of word-of-mouth communication across these two 
points in time. Put simply: recommendations that are made after the student experience 
will be based on, or informed by, more intense feelings (positive or negative) than those 
made during the experience itself. Thus, bad experiences become very bad, and good 
experiences become very good, in retrospect. For HE managers, therefore, the effec- 
tiveness of positive word-of-mouth activity as a pure recruitment and promotional 
tool may be most evident when it originates from rememberers. This indicates the 
beneﬁts of mobilising and engaging alumni for marketing a course through word-of- 
mouth recommendations. However, should the primary objective be to improve the 
accuracy of affective forecasting and subsequent decision-making amongst prospective 
students, then the broader and tempered word-of-mouth reviews of current students 
could be of value as a de-focusing tool (see above). 
 
 
 
Recommendations for further research 
We have noted previously that the impact bias appears to be a particularly robust 
phenomenon that occurs across a very wide range of contexts. As such, the results 
of the current study may be expected to generalise to other courses, disciplines, insti- 
tutions and any aspect of the educational experience that students are required to evalu- 
ate. However, it would be helpful for further research to engage in replication of the 
current ﬁndings in other HE contexts (e.g. in relation to a wider range of courses, dis- 
ciplines and student experiences). 
Given that the great majority of participants reported positive evaluations in the 
current study, our analysis is necessarily limited to the positive impact bias. Whilst 
it may be relatively uncommon for prospective students to anticipate negative 
emotional experiences during a course they are about to undertake (as evidenced 
by previous academic research, the UK PTES and our study), it is certainly not 
out   of   the  question.  A   speciﬁc   investigation  of   the  existence,  nature  and 
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consequences of the negative impact bias in such cases would constitute a useful 
extension of our work. Further research may also be undertaken to examine the 
durability aspect of the impact bias in an HE context; i.e. to explore the expected, 
perceived  and  remembered  duration  for  which  emotional  responses  persist  in 
relation to certain aspects of the student experience (e.g. leaving home and begin- 
ning university life). 
Three further issues for future research may emerge from a broader critical perspec- 
tive. First, it may be useful to consider the relationship between affective states and aca- 
demic performance. For example, there is an ongoing debate in the HE sector as to 
whether student satisfaction, and indeed happiness, is positively correlated with effec- 
tive learning and intellectual development (see Furedi 2012). Second, in the social 
psychological tradition of impact bias research it has been assumed that affective 
scales provide a valid measure of affective experience (Gilbert et al. 1998, 2004; 
Wilson et al. 2000; Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2003; Meyvis, Ratner, and Levav 
2010). However, this raises the question of whether this is the case in the context of 
HE. As a means of examining the extent to which scale-based evaluations reﬂect uni- 
versity students’ lived experience, further qualitative research is recommended to 
explore the nature, intensity and stability of their affective expectations, experiences 
and memory. Finally, our study suggests the need for a wider and more detailed inves- 
tigation into questionnaire surveys as a suitable means of evaluating students’ experi- 
ences and feelings. Impact bias, it would seem, presents yet another potential 
methodological concern regarding such instruments, adding to previously identiﬁed 
issues such as response bias (Richardson 2012) and differing student interpretations 
of survey questions (Bennett and Kane 2014). 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, and in response to calls in the literature for a greater focus on understand- 
ing the affective experience of students in the context of their expectations (Miller, 
Bender, and Schuh 2005; Beard, Clegg, and Smith 2007), our paper validates and 
extends previous demonstrations of the impact bias in an HE context. There are 
many deﬁnitions of the student experience, but it is difﬁcult to imagine that the relation- 
ship between affective forecasts, experience and memory is not consistently a central 
aspect. We show evidence of the impact bias with regard to postgraduate students’ 
affective evaluations of their general happiness and, also, their postgraduate and disser- 
tation experiences. 
The impact bias may have important implications for student decision-making, 
timing and comparability of course evaluations, and the nature and impact of word- 
of-mouth communication. Ultimately, it  provides  an  important reminder that  as 
human beings we have a tendency towards overly optimistic (or overly pessimistic) 
views of the future and the past. An appreciation of the inevitability of this is critical 
to understanding and managing students throughout their HE journey, and beyond. 
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